Tribal legends claim that in the foothills of the Afghan mountains, Cain (Qabil), an arable farmer, committed the first murder by killing his brother Abel (Habil), the shepherd. Cain and Abel have long been understood as the first and second sons of Adam and Eve in the religions of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. Their story is told in the Bible and Torah at Genesis 4:1-16 and the Qur’an at 5:26-32. Although their story is cited in the Quran, neither of them is mentioned by name.

In present-day Afghanistan, this story comes to life in a figurative sense: Cain, the poppy-growing farmer, continues to kill Abel, the shepherd who lives in the mountains. Even leaving myths and fables side, sons of Afghanistan have been killing each other, albeit with external assistance, for thirty years.

But things may change for better—or worse—on Thursday, when Afghanistan holds its second democratic presidential election; its first democratic election in 2004 yielded Hamid Karzai as president. In preparation for this historical event, President Barack Obama has ordered 17,000 US troops to Afghanistan since assuming the office of President in January 2009. Obama had hoped to head off as much insurgence as possible before the election, thereby assuring a mostly peaceful vote that can be viewed as legitimate, both by Afghans and the international community.

The likelihood of a nonviolent Afghanistan on August 20 seems a bit much to ask for. The Taliban has already promised forceful opposition to the election, threatening to cut off the ink-stained fingers of those who cast their votes. Taliban leaders across Afghanistan have asked true followers of Islam to boycott the election, and foreign and local troops alike are ramping up security around polling centers in anticipation of potential unrest. However, the possibility remains that Taliban threats will keep people away from the polls on Thursday, and this eventuality could mean problems for Afghanistan in the future.

This election is critical not only for Afghanistan but for all stakeholders including the United States, Pakistan, India, and Iran; and not for the same reason. One cannot be certain that this election will optimize governance model or reduce corruption or for that matter enhance security posture: all inter-related variables, all necessary for a stable Afghanistan.

Our friend at Carnegie Council Mr. David Speedie who has just released four policy papers on Afghanistan points out that “the U.S./NATO and Russia have clear and urgent common interests in promoting long-term stability in Afghanistan, yet cooperation between Russia and the West is “episodic,” rather than strategic or systematic.” Speedie advises us to look at Afghanistan in the broader context of Central Asia and feels that current challenges facing NATO may render it “obsolete in its present form.”

For Pakistan this election is critical because it will determine how Afghanistan is positioned in the geo-political landscape. First of all, if Afghanistan is decoupled from its South Asian neighbor and aligned with Central Asian states, Pakistan will loose leverage. But an unstable Afghanistan, the status quo, is detrimental for Pakistan as well. Secondly, if Afghanistan continues to develop deeper ties with India it will create imbalances in the region. It is no secret or exaggeration that India’s growing influence in Afghanistan comes at the expense of Pakistan’s interest. Exploiting the post 9/11 situation and piggy backing on the US invasion, India has accelerated its own presence and influence in Afghanistan. Outcome of the election will determine which direction this tide will turn.

In an August 13 question-and-answer session, Karin von Hippel, codirector of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at Washington D.C.’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, responded to questions about the fate of Afghanistan in the face of these elections. When asked about the possible outcomes of voting, von Hippel described a few different scenarios, the first being that incumbent Hamid Karzai would win by a small percentage over 50%, which is what he needs to win without a runoff with another opponent. Von Hippel thinks this will most likely create the least amount of instability, since any large margin of victory for Karzai might cause “accusations of fraud, public challenges by competing candidates, and potentially widespread violence in the north and in Kabul where many Tajiks live.”

Another possible development involves a runoff, most likely between Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah, a half-Tajik, half-Pashtun doctor who is widely considered to be Karzai’s biggest competition. This situation might also lead to hostility, since a strong Taliban presence in majority Pashtun districts might lead to a low voter turnout in areas where Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, has the biggest following. In the case of a runoff, most polls predict a win for Karzai.

Whatever the outcome of the election, von Hippel feels “the results will be considered a positive step for Afghanistan if they are perceived as mostly free and fair,” although at the moment a free and fair outcome does not seem highly probable. In Kabul on August 17, Abdullah told a crowd of supporters that his victory was ensured, as long as the election was fair and no fraud was committed. In a country like Afghanistan where tension runs high and a governmental shift could mean the difference between life and death for many people, these statements are highly inflammatory. In fact, some fear that Abdullah’s talk of election fraud will cause his supporters to riot if he does not emerge victorious.

To be fair, Abdullah’s allegation of fraud is not the mere blathering of a man desperate for power. Indeed, there have been rumblings of discontent with the voting process from many corners over the past few weeks. In addition to the discovery of thousands of fake voter registration cards across the country, as many as 700 of 7,000 planned polling locations are expected to be shut down due to violence, particularly in Taliban strongholds in the south. If this is the case, it is no wonder many cannot bring themselves to hope for a truly democratic election.

Karzai and Abdullah have stolen much of the international media spotlight aimed at Afghanistan in the weeks preceding the election, but there are in fact two other contenders who are seen as potential dark horses in the upcoming race. Ramazan Bashardost, an ethnic Hazara with a formidable education, is making headway in the election, gaining approval as an outspoken opponent of the current corruption and abuse of power that exists in Afghanistan’s government.

Ashraf Ghani, an ethnic Pashtun and respected scholar, is a former Afghan finance minister and World Bank senior analyst. Ghani enjoys a great deal of popularity on the international level as a result of his thoughts on state building, and his campaign has focused on terminating governmental corruption in Afghanistan and developing a strong infrastructure for Afghanistan.

Neither Bashardos nor Ghani are expected to win a large amount of votes on Thursday, but their presence in the election is vital, if only as obstacles to a runoff-free win for Karzai.

Regardless of outcome, Thursday’s elections will be a huge milestone for Afghanistan, and an event that will determine not only its president, but also the outlook for the future.

India is already hoping for a Karzai win: President Karzai who studied in Indian University and has enjoyed living there during his youth fully embraced India in his last term. India is looking for access to the energy-rich Central Asian states like Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan and views Kabul as a gateway. India is also eager to neutralize Pakistan’s influence. But India that has historically supported Northern Alliance, Rasheed Dostum and other anti-Pushtoon elements is bound to change the eco-system of the region. Even after US leaves, Afghanistan will have to deal with this regional hegemony.

As China and Russia strengthen ties, Indo-Sino ties seem to become more fragile, now feebler than at any other time in last decade. India has amplified its rhetoric against China, and Beijing has been frank in expressing concern over India’s planned Agni-V ballistic missile test. From Arunachal Pradesh to Azad Kashmir, there have been several key instances last week in which Indian foreign policymakers seem to have been unnerved, even alleging China is constructing a dam on the Brahmaputra.

Indians argue that that it will take at least three years before Agni-V becomes operational, since it will require four or five more tests, series production, and user-trials by the armed forces. Indians also claim that the 5,000-km strike range of Agni-V is trifling when compared to China’s DongFeng 31A missile, which can hit targets 11,200 km away. An unnamed official source quoted in Indian newspapers state: “China’s missile and nuclear arsenal is leagues ahead of India, capable as it is of hitting any city in India. We can never compete. Our entire focus is on building only credible minimum deterrence against China, not active offensive capabilities.”

I agree—India can never compete with China, and I don’t understand the logic of building “deterrence” when by its own admission India recognizes it is not in the same league as China. Of course there is always more than meets the eye. Agni-V will be mobile and can be moved closer to the Chinese border on short notice, bringing even China’s northern-most city, Habin, within the missile’s strike envelope.

India is also developing Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) warheads for the Agni missiles. An MIRV payload is basically several nuclear warheads carried on a single missile, which can be programmed to hit different targets, independent of each other. In effect, this means that even ballistic missile defense systems can be overwhelmed by MIRVs.

Indians claim this is aligned with their nuclear doctrine, which says, “Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.”

The gravity of this doctrine can be accurately understood when you look at other news items in Indo-Sino relations last week.

Indians have been making a commotion about the Brahmaputra dam and China’s alleged involvement in Azad Kashmir. In November 2006 India and China agreed to establish an Expert Level Mechanism to discuss trans-border river issues in an institutional way. Three meetings have been held so far. The Chinese maintain that there are no plans to build any large scale diversion projects on the Brahmaputra River.

But Indians can’t seem to trust this statement or any other promises from China. Reports from New Delhi claim that the Indian government will “ascertain whether there are recent developments that suggest any change in the position conveyed to us by the government of China.”

When Indian premier Manmohan Singh met Chinese president Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the ASEM summit in Beijing, the two men devoted most of their time discussing the Brahmaputra.

And as if clashes over Agni-V and the Brahmaputra were not enough, Indians have been clamoring about Arunachal Pradesh and Azad Kashmir. India has been critical of China’s development activities in Azad Kashmir, and Indian external affairs ministry spokesman Vishnu Prakash was quoted saying, “We hope that the Chinese side will take a long term view of the India-China relations, and cease such activities in areas illegally occupied by Pakistan.”

During a meeting with Pakistan Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani last week, the Chinese president outlined a major project to upgrade the Karakoram highway, which connects the two countries overland, and coordinated Chinese help in the Neelam-Jhelum hydroelectric project in Kashmir. “Howsoever, the international situation may change. The people of China and Pakistan are always joined in hearts and hands,” Hu said at that time.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) also claimed that the State of Arunachal Pradesh is an integral and inalienable part of India. The statement was issued by a Ministry spokesman shortly after China expressed “strong” dissatisfaction over Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s recent visit to Arunachal Pradesh for electioneering.

I can’t keep myself from wondering: Why is India so angst-ridden?

Surely, it cannot be because China has expressed solidarity with Pakistan; after all, Pak-Sino relations reach back through six decades of trust. What is rather interesting—and must also be disconcerting to India— is Russia’s emergent ties with China. It was not long ago that India ditched Russia to draw nearer to the U.S. Until that point, ‘Hindu- Rossi bhai bhai’ was the most popular slogan in India. But things have changed. Both Chinese and Russian media have given extensive coverage to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s visit to China on October 12-14, speaking highly of the trip and expressing optimism over the prospects of Russian-Chinese ties.

Last week China and Russia signed 12 agreements, whose total monetary value exceeds $4 billion. The premiers of each country convened to hold their fourteenth regular meeting in Beijing, which included a framework agreement on Russia’s export of natural gas to China, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on high-speed trains, and an agreement on mutual notification of ballistic missiles and launch of carrier rockets.

The burgeoning dynamics between China-Russia and China-Pakistan are unraveling India, and the New Delhi foreign ministry appears to be in a tail spin.

Indians and Pakistanis are discussing the leadership crisis in their respective countries, but for different reasons and with different implications. India’s inability to wield influence on the world stage is being blamed on the lack of good leadership. In Pakistan, people feel that the political leaders have failed to instill confidence and provide direction when the country is consumed by the threat of terrorism. Are these leadership demands signs of widening and maturing democracy in the two countries? Or are the Indians and Pakistanis wanting to re-live the hope and optimism characterizing the era of Nehru and Jinnah? Whatever may be the rationale, the demand for better leadership is showing different traits of the public in India and Pakistan.

Dawn Columnist, Cyril Almedia wrote a timely article, “Where are you, our leaders”, on the October 23, 2009. The opening lines of his column are illustrative of what many Pakistanis are thinking:

As the country burns, parents agonize over whether to send their children to school or not, offices of businesses local and foreign ramp up their security measures, the average citizen thinks twice before venturing into crowded locales or government buildings, a simple question for our leaders: where are you? Where are you, President Zardari? Where are you, Prime Minister Gilani? Where are you, Nawaz Sharif?

While making an eloquent plea to the Pakistani leadership for reassuring the common people, Cyril adds, “politics existed yesterday and it will exist tomorrow. Right now the people are scared and they need their leaders to show some leadership.”

The recent post at CHUP, titled “An Era of Citizen Resolve” highlights how the scores of Pakistanis are ready to confront and fight terrorists, a challenge evaded by the country’s leadership. Pakistani students from Universities across the country launched a group named Jaag Meeray Talib-e-Ilm requesting the Government to reopen universities and provide adequte security.

Across the disputed border in India, Hindustan Times-CNN IBN Survey shows that 41% of the population believes that lack of leadership is holding back India from becoming a world power. The survey raised a question, which appeared strange to me: “Has the moral leadership that Nehru and Gandhi stood for ended in India? Are there no such towering figures to give India the much-needed identity?” I am not sure how many Indians would be happy if Nehru and Gandhi held the reigns of power in today’s India.

It is widely believed that despite impressive rates of economic growth, Indian leadership has not been able to tackle the challenges of criminalization of politics, lack of infrastructure and high rates of illiteracy. The inability of the leadership to tackle basic issues of governance tends to pull-back India on the world stage.

Indians and Pakistanis share a common sentiment in their distinct demands: a desire for responsive, responsible and dynamic leadership. But this is where the similarity ends. The demands made by the people of the two countries on their respective leaderships are startlingly different: for Pakistanis it’s an issue of national survival while the Indians desire national assertiveness on the world stage. Moreover, the case for stronger leadership in Pakistan is not the topic of television debates like in India; it is a demand voiced at street protests and every-day conversations. Recent public demonstrations in India are usually parochial; the demands affect only a specific social, cultural or economic group. National demands, on issues that affect the entire country have been more common in Pakistan than in India during the past decade.

Whether its the airline pilots going on strike or threat of protests by IIT faculty; whether its farmers raising demands against SEZ or people of Tamil Nadu criticizing the Center’s Sri Lanka policy, only local concerns tend to galvanize Indians. Have we ever witnessed protests aganist judicial corruption or illiteracy across the nation? From the long march earlier this year favor in support of deposed CJ Chaudhry to the less noticed public protest against the Government’s Taliban policy, the people of Pakistan have joined hand across regional and sectarian divisions to exert pressure on their political leaders.

India has not witnessed widespread protests on a major national issue in recent years. Many would argue that the democratic system allows Indians other avenues to voice their concerns. The fact however remains that existence of ‘other democratic avenues’ did not prevent Indians from participating in scores of protests relating to parochial demands. India can pride itself with vibrant structural democracy but Pakistan is showing impressive signs of popular involvement despite its poor record at institutional democracy. India and Indians need to move beyond their criticism of Pakistani democracy to support and appreciation of Pakistani people showcasing their democratic resilience.

post by: http://teeth.com.pk